Greek Texts & Translations

But what has all this to do with me? Why, for my part, I am amazed if they have discovered any excuse or pretext which will make it possible in your court for any man, if convicted of assault and battery, to escape punishment. The laws take a far different view, and have provided that even pleas of necessity shall not be pressed too far. For example (you see I have had to inquire into these matters and inform myself about them because of the defendant), 54.18there are actions for evil-speaking; and I am told that these are instituted for this purpose—that men may not be led on, by using abusive language back and forth, to deal blows to one another. Again, there are actions for battery; and these, I hear, exist for this reason—that a man, finding himself the weaker party, may not defend himself with a stone or anything of that sort, but may await legal redress. Again, there are public prosecutions for wounding, to the end that wounds may not lead to murder. 54.19The least of these evils, namely abusive language, has, I think, been provided for to prevent the last and most grievous, that murder may not ensue, and that men be not led on step by step from vilification to blows, from blows to wounds, and from wounds to murder, but that in the laws its own penalty should be provided for each of these acts, and that the decision should not be left to the passion or the will of the person concerned.

54.20This, then, is what is ordained in the laws; but if Conon says, “We belong to a club of Ithyphalli, and in our love-affairs we strike and throttle whom we please,” are you, then, going to let him off with a laugh? I think not. No one of you would have been seized with a fit of laughter, if he had happened to be present when I was dragged and stripped and maltreated, when I was borne home on a litter to the house which I had left strong and well, and my mother rushed out, and the women set up such a wailing and screaming (as if someone had died in the house) that some of the neighbors sent to inquire what it was that had happened. 54.21Speaking broadly, men of the jury, I hold it right that no man should have any excuse or immunity to rely on, when he is brought before you, so valid that he is to be permitted to commit outrage; but if allowance is to be made for anyone, it should be for those only who commit an act of this sort in the folly of youth,—it is for these, I say, that such indulgence should be reserved, and even in their case it should not extend to the remission of the penalty, but to its mitigation. 54.22But when a man over fifty years of age in the company of younger men, and these his own sons, not only did not discourage or prevent their wantonness, but has proved himself the leader and the foremost and the vilest of all, what punishment could he suffer that would be commensurate with his deeds? For my part, I think that even death would be too mild. Why, if Conon had committed none of the acts himself, but had merely stood by while his son Ctesias did what he is himself proved to have done, you would regard him with loathing, and rightly. 54.23For if he has trained up his sons in such fashion that they feel no fear or shame while committing in his presence crimes for some of which the punishment of death is ordained, what punishment do you think too severe for him? I think these actions are a proof that he has no reverence for his own father; for if he had honored and feared him, he would have exacted honor and fear from his own children.

54.24Now take the statutes, that concerning assault and that concerning highway robbers. You will see that the defendant is amenable to them both. Read.Laws

By both these statutes, then, the defendant Conon is amenable for what he has done; for he committed both assault and highway robbery. If I on my part have not chosen to proceed against him under these statutes, that should fairly prove that I am a peaceful and inoffensive person, not that he is any the less a villain. 54.25And, assuredly, if anything had happened to me, ^note he would have been liable to a charge of murder and the severest of penalties. At any rate the father of the priestess at Brauron, ^note although it was admitted that he had not laid a finger on the deceased, but had merely urged the one who dealt the blow to keep on striking, was banished by the court of the Areopagus. And justly; for, if the bystanders, instead of preventing those who through the influence of drink or anger or any other cause are undertaking to act lawlessly, are themselves to urge them on, there is no hope of safety for one who falls in with lawless rascals; he may be sure that he will be maltreated until they grow weary as was the case with me.